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Abstract
We study robust long-term complex behaviour in the Rock-Scissors-Paper game with
two players, played using reinforcement learning. The complex behaviour is connected to
the existence of a heteroclinic network for the dynamics. This network is made of three
heteroclinic cycles consisting of nine equilibria and the trajectories connecting them. We
provide analytical proof both for the existence of chaotic switching near the heteroclinic
network and for the relative asymptotic stability of at least one cycle in the network,
leading to behaviour ranging from almost deterministic actions to chaotic-like dynamics.
Our results are obtained by making use of the symmetry of the original problem, a new
approach in the context of learning.
JEL classiﬁcation: C72, D83
Keywords: learning process, dynamics, switching, chaos
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a thriving expansion within the subject of learning in games, both
from the point of view of population dynamics in biology and from that of strategic thinking
applied to economics. Two landmark references are Hofbauer and Sigmund [17] concerning
the ﬁrst viewpoint and Fudenberg and Levine [10] concerning the latter. See also Hofbauer
and Sigmund [19] and Fudenberg and Levine [11] for more recent updates. Clearly, the
two perspectives are not mutually exclusive and share common concerns such as asymptotic
behaviour and convergence to equilibrium, learning rules or adaptation processes leading, or
not, to equilibrium in the long-run.
Results have been achieved in many settings, both experimentally, numerically or analyt-
ically. Our results are analitycal but we refer to the papers by Roth and Erev [23, 7] and by
Henrich et al. [15], as well as references in these papers, for an experimental treatment of
learning. Numerical simulations are pervasive in the literature, out of necessity when models
become too hard to solve. We refer to the work of Chawanya [5] and Sato et al. [25, 26] on
this point.2
A central issue in learning is that of the learning procedure itself. This may consist, for
instance, in simple imitation, in taking into account previous best-responses or in responding
to some reinforcement received after an action. In the two latter cases, memory (or lack
thereof) is also an issue: if there is memory loss then the eﬀect of recent events is stronger
than that of earlier ones; with perfect memory, all events aﬀect the agent in the same way. See
Hofbauer and Sigmund [19]. Since diﬀerent games produce diﬀerent outcomes with diﬀerent
learning processes, it has been an issue to decide which learning processes will eventually
lead to equilibrium for each type of game. See Roth and Erev [23] for a comparison between
behaviour in experiments and learning models.
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1Most learning processes or models ﬁt into, possibly a variation, of ﬁctitious play: a process
where players are engaged in playing a ﬁnite game repeatedly (this includes inﬁnite repeti-
tion). The state of play is given by a probability vector, describing the mixed strategies of
the agents. The dynamics of play are described by a dynamical system having the probability
vectors describing the mixed strategies as state variables. One important question is that of
ﬁnding out whether the dynamics will converge to a Nash equilibrium in the long-run. In
the case of two players, one with 2 strategies and another with n ≥ 2 strategies, Berger [2]
showed that, both in discrete- and continuous-time, the dynamics approach equilibrium, thus
solving the problem of asymptotic behaviour. However, Roth and Erev [23] do point out
that, in view of experimental results, the “intermediate term predictions of dynamic learning
models may be even more important than their asymptotic properties”. In fact, transient
dynamics can be rather diﬀerent from asymptotic behaviour, as pointed out by Izquierdo et
al. [20].
It is also well-known that asymptotic behaviour may not coincide with the Nash equilib-
rium of the ﬁnite game. In such cases, it is important to describe the asymptotic behaviour,
which may range from periodic (see Shapley [28] and Sparrow et al. [29]) to chaotic (see
Richards [22], Sato et al. [25, 26] and also Sparrow et al. [29]). Lack of convergence to
equilibrium was observed in experiments by Feltovich [8]. Chaotic behaviour may arise or
be described in diﬀerent ways: Richards [22] and Sparrow et al. [29] address the existence of
chaotic behaviour in the Shapley game [28], the former using a geometric argument and the
latter by looking at the stable manifold of the periodic orbit (this is a result announced for a
future paper). Sato et al. [25, 26] provide numerical evidence for the existence of complicated
dynamics in a Rock-Scissors-Paper game with two players, arising from the existence of a
heteroclinic network for the dynamics.
Our results add to the description of asymptotic behaviour when it does not converge
to equilibrium. We do this by way of an example, even though the techniques we use may
be applied to any game with analogous properties. We use Sato et al. [25, 26] and show,
analytically, that in the Rock-Scissors-Paper (henceforth, RSP) game with two players there is
inﬁnite switching, leading to behaviour ranging from almost deterministic actions to chaotic-
like dynamics. Each pair of choices, one for each player, among the possible actions of Rock,
Scissors or Paper, is an equilibrium of a dynamical system that describes the dynamics of
play. In this game there are 9 equilibria connected by trajectories and forming what is known
as a heteroclinic network. After one choice of action, each player may make a certain number
of choices at the next moment of play. The trajectories connecting the equilibria in the
network reﬂect precisely these possible sequences of play. The existence of switching means
that, given any possible sequence of play in the network, there are initial choices of action
for each player such that the choices made throughout the game are exactly those described
by the sequence. Thus, every possible sequence of actions may indeed take place in a game,
including both simple sequences, involving a small number of equilibria, and sequences of
play involving all equilibria chosen in random order.
This provides a distinct route to chaos from that considered by Richards [22] and Sparrow
et al. [29] in a context that is equally simple. Furthermore, in our example there is coexistence
of random (in which trajectories of play follow complex patterns) and almost deterministic
(in which players alternate between two actions) behaviour. We will show that when a draw
is penalized, players avoid sequences that involve draws, thus restricting the actions in a
deterministic way. This is related to the stability of the cycles in the network.
In proving our results we make strong use of the symmetry of the problem thus opening
a new way of dealing with the issue of asymptotic behaviour in this context of games. The
symmetry allows us to reduce the study of the dynamics near a network involving 9 equilibria
in a 4-dimensional space to that of the dynamics near a network involving 3 equilibria and a
smaller number of trajectories connecting them.
The following section provides the preliminary results and notation required. In section
23, we describe the heteroclinic network in the RSP game, as well as the quotient network,
with 3 equilibria, induced by symmetry. The properties of the networks are essential for the
results that follow. Section 4 is devoted to the study of the dynamics of the reduced problem
with 3 equilibria. We prove the existence of inﬁnite switching near the quotient network,
study the stability of the cycles that constitute the network, and the stability of the network
as a whole. This is divided into subsections that lead to the proof of theorem 4.5. The
last subsection of section 4 deals with the stability of the cycles in the quotient network and
provides an explanation for a preference for one of the cycles of play, when the payoﬀ for
ties is negative for at least one player. In section 5, we extend the results obtained for the
quotient network to the original network of the RSP game. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminary results and notation
Consider a system of diﬀerential equations
˙ x = f(x,λ), (1)
with x ∈ Rn, λ ∈ Rm and f a smooth vector ﬁeld.
Symmetry We introduce some background on group theory and equivariant dynamics
needed throughout the paper. Other concepts and results not deﬁned here can be found in
Bredon [4], Chossat and Lauterbach [6], Golubitsky and Schaeﬀer [12] or Field [9].
Let Γ be a compact Lie group acting on Rn.S y s t e m( 1 )i sequivariant by Γo rΓ - symmetric
if it commutes with the action of Γ, that is
f(γx,λ)=γf(x,λ), ∀γ ∈ Γ ∀x ∈ Rn.
Let G be a subgroup of Γ. The set of points x ∈ Rn that are kept invariant by the action
of the elements in G is a subspace of Rn,t h eﬁxed-point subspace of G
Fix(G)={x ∈ Rn : δx = x, ∀δ ∈ G}.
Fixed-point subspaces possess the important property of being invariant by the ﬂow of f,
that is, the dynamics of a state in Fix(G)r e m a i ni nFix(G).
The isotropy subgroup of a point x ∈ Rn, denoted by Γx, corresponds to the elements of
Γt h a tﬁ xx,
Γx = {γ ∈ Γ: γx = x}.
The group Γ acts freely on a set S ∈ Rn,i fΓ x = {Id}, for all x ∈ S,w i t hId the identity
element. That is, the only element of Γ that can ﬁx a point x ∈ X, diﬀerent from the origin,
is the identity element.
The Γ-orbit of a point x ∈ Rn is the set of images of x under the action of the group Γ
Γ(x)={γx : γ ∈ Γ}.
An analogous deﬁnition applies to the Γ-orbit of any ﬂow invariant set. An important and
straightforward consequence is that the elements in the Γ-orbit of an equilibrium of system
(1) are also equilibria of the system. More generally, if S is a ﬂow invariant set, then so are
the sets γS, γ ∈ Γ, in its group orbit. Thus, the elements in the Γ-orbit of solution curves
of system (1) are conjugated solution curves. Moreover, the elements in the Γ-orbit of a
ﬁxed-point subspace are ﬁxed-point subspaces with conjugated dynamics.
Let S be a subset of Rn. The set of all Γ-orbits of S, denoted by S/Γ, is called the quotient
space or orbit space.
If S is a manifold and the group Γ acts freely on S then the orbit space S/Γ will again be
a manifold. If S is a smooth ﬁnite-dimensional manifold, Γ is compact and Γ acts smoothly
3on S, then the orbit space S/Γ is a stratiﬁed manifold ([6]). For a deﬁnition of stratiﬁcation
and orbit-stratum see Deﬁnitions 4.10.(10-12) of Chossat and Lauterbach [6].
If S is invariant by the ﬂow of f, then the ﬂow of f restricts to a ﬂow on S/Γ. By the
Smooth Lifting Theorem (theorem 0.2) in Schwarz [27], when Γ is a compact Lie group and S
is a smooth manifold, for each smooth Γ-equivariant vector ﬁeld on S, there is a corresponding
smooth strata-preserving vector ﬁeld on S/Γ.
Heteroclinic network Let pi, i =1 ,...,rbe saddle equilibria for the ﬂow of f. By saddle
equilibria we mean that the equilibria pi have non-trivial stable and unstable manifolds,
Ws(pi)  = {pi} and Wu(pi)  = {pi}, i =1 ,...,r.
A heteroclinic connection from pi to pj, denoted by [pi → pj], is a trajectory in Wu(pi)∩
Ws(pj).
There is a heteroclinic cycle connecting the saddle equilibria pi, i =1 ,...,r if there is
a reordering of the equilibria such that there are heteroclinic connections [pi → pi+1], for
i =1 ,...,r− 1, and [pr → p1].
A heteroclinic network is deﬁned to be a connected union of heteroclinic cycles. It follows
that, given any two equilibria in the network, there is a sequence of connections taking one
to the other. We will also refer to the equilibria in the network as nodes of the network.
The existence of heteroclinic networks is a common phenomenon in problems where there
exist invariant spaces. This can be a consequence of symmetry (see Krupa [21] or Field [9])
or of the formulation of the problem itself, as is the case of games or population dynamics
(see Hofbauer [16] or Hofbauer and Sigmund [18]).
Switching Let Σ be a heteroclinic network for the ﬂow of f. We loosely follow the set-up
in Aguiar et al. [1].
We deﬁne a (ﬁnite) path on the network Σ as a sequence of connections (ci), i =1 ,...,s
in Σ such that ci =[ pi → pj]a n dci+1 =[ pj → pk], with pi,p j and pk equilibria in Σ. An
inﬁnite path corresponds to an inﬁnite sequence of connections (ci), i ∈ N.N o t e t h a t , w e
consider i ∈ N, and not i ∈ Z, for an inﬁnite path because our original problem is one of
game theory and so there is a beginning of play.
Given a path on the network Σ, we say that there is a trajectory for the ﬂow of f that
follows that path, if for every neighbourhood V of the sequence of connections in Σ deﬁning
that path, there is a trajectory for the ﬂow of f contained in V . That is to say, there is a
trajectory for the ﬂow of f as close as required to the sequence of connections in Σ deﬁning
the path.
We say there is ﬁnite (inﬁnite) switching near a network if for every ﬁnite (inﬁnite) path
on the network there is a trajectory, near the network, for the ﬂow of f that follows that
path.
We refer to the type of switching thus described as chaotic.
3 A heteroclinic network in the Rock-Scissors-Paper game
We start by recalling the description of the Rock-Scissors-Paper game (see, for instance, Sato
et al. [26]). Two agents X and Y have the option of playing one of three actions : ‘rock’ (R),
‘scissors’ (S)a n d‘ p a p e r ’( P). An agent playing R (S, P) beats the other playing S (P, R,
respectively).
Let x1,x 2,x 3 ≥ 0, with x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, denote the probability of agent X playing the
action R, S,o rP, respectively. Analogously, for y1,y 2 and y3 and agent Y .
For each agent, the state space is a two-dimensional simplex, and the collective state
space ∆ = ∆X × ∆Y is four-dimensional.
The normalized interaction matrices are
4A =


2
3 x 1 − 1
3 x −1 − 1
3 x
−1 − 1
3 x
2
3 x 1 − 1
3 x
1 − 1
3 x −1 − 1
3 x
2
3 x


and
B =


2
3 y 1 − 1
3 y −1 − 1
3 y
−1 − 1
3 y
2
3 y 1 − 1
3 y
1 − 1
3 y −1 − 1
3 y
2
3 y

,
where  x,  y ∈ (−1.0,1.0) are the rewards for ties. Unlike Sato et al. [26], we exclude the
boundary of the interval. Note that, on the boundary, a tie is either as good as a win or as
bad as a defeat.
We consider the case of perfect memory and equal rates of adaptation, and so the dynamics
are given by the following equations (these are the replicator equations, extensively used in
population dynamics)
˙ xi = xi
 
(Ay)i − xTAy
 
˙ yj = yj
 
(Bx)j − yTBx
  (2)
with i,j =1 ,2,3. Reinforcement learning, for each player, is described by the terms in
brackets.
Notice that the coordinate hyperplanes are invariant by the ﬂow of (2).
System (2) is equivariant under the symmetry group Γ of order 3 generated by the action
of
σ(x1,x 2,x 3,y 1,y 2,y 3)=( x3,x 1,x 2,y 3,y 1,y 2).
The intersection of Fix(Γ) = {(x,x,x,y,y,y);x,y ∈ R} with ∆ corresponds to the Nash
equilibrium (x∗,y∗)=
 1
3, 1
3, 1
3, 1
3, 1
3, 1
3
 
, which is a saddle with 2-dimensional stable and un-
stable manifolds. Besides the Nash equilibrium there are nine equilibria, that correspond to
the vertices of ∆, given by (x,y)w h e r ex,y ∈{ R,S,P} with R =( 1 ,0,0), S =( 0 ,1,0) and
P =( 0 ,0,1).
Note that the set of the nine equilibria can be partioned into Γ-orbits as follows
Γ((R,P)) = {(R,P),(S,R),(P,S)}≡ξ0
Γ((R,S)) = {(R,S),(S,P),(P,R)}≡ξ1
Γ((R,R)) = {(R,R),(S,S),(P,P)}≡ξ2
We have denoted by ξi, i =0 ,1,2, respectively, the Γ-orbit of the equilibria (R,P), (R,S)
and (R,R). Along ξ0, agent Y wins over agent X, whereas along ξ1 the opposite occurs.
Along ξ2 there is a draw in play.
Proposition 3.1. There is a heteroclinic network Σ in ∆ involving all the equilibria at the
vertices of ∆.
Proof. The existence of a heteroclinic network in the intersection of the invariant hyperplanes
with ∆ is highly likely. We use the standard technique of Guckenheimer and Holmes [13].
We must conﬁrm that the eigenvalues of the equilibria at the vertices have the correct signs
and that there are no equilibria on the one-dimensional edges joining the equilibria at the
vertices.
The analysis of the eigenvalues and eigendirections is easier if we work on invariant spheres
rather than on simplices. We thus make the coordinate change: xi = u2
i and yi = v2
i ,
i =1 ,2,3. In the new coordinates the system is given by
˙ ui =
1
2
ui
 
(Av2)i − (u2)TAv2 
˙ vj =
1
2
vj
 
(Bu2)j − (v2)TBu2 
(3)
5with i,j =1 ,2,3, where u2 =( u2
1,u 2
2,u 2
3)T and v2 =( v2
1,v2
2,v2
3)T,w i t hu2
1 + u2
2 + u2
3 =1a n d
v2
1 + v2
2 + v2
3 = 1 invariant by the ﬂow.
The manifold ∆ = ∆x × ∆y becomes the fundamental domain
D = {(u1,u 2,u 3,v 1,v 2,v 3) ∈ (R+
0 )6 : u2
1 + u2
2 + u2
3 =1 ,v2
1 + v2
2 + v2
3 =1 },
of the manifold given by the direct product of two 2-dimensional spheres.
There are many similarities between the geometry of the ﬂow for the systems (2) and
(3)(Krupa [21]). In fact, the coordinate change corresponds to a smooth conjugacy of the
ﬂows restricted, respectively, to ∆ and D. In particular, trajectories on the edges of ∆ joining
the equilibria at the vertices of ∆ are analogous to trajectories on the edges of D joining the
corresponding equilibria. The sign of the eigenvalues of the linearization at the equilibria is
preserved even though their magnitude is decreased by half.
Let ei,i=1 ,...,6 denote the vectors of the canonical basis of R6. Table 1 contains the
information about the eigenvalues and eigenvectors for the three Γ-orbits of equilibria, ξ0, ξ1
and ξ2.
Equilibria e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6
ξ0 1+1
3 x 1 > 0 1+ x
2 > 0
−1+ y
2 < 0 −1 < 0 −1+1
3 y
ξ1 −1+1
3 x
−1+ x
2 < 0 −1 < 0
1+ y
2 > 0 1+1
3 y 1 > 0
ξ2 −2
3 x
−1− x
2 < 0 1− x
2 > 0 −2
3 y
−1− y
2 < 0
1− y
2 > 0
Table 1: Eigenvalues and eigenvectors for the Γ-orbits of equilibria of system (3). The vectors
ei are those of the canonical basis of R6 in a system of local coordinates at each point of the
group orbit of each ξj, j =0 ,1,2.
Tedious, but straightforward, computations show that there are no equilibria on the
one-dimensional edges joining the equilibria at the vertices. The signs of the non-radial
eigenvalues indicated in table 1 together with the Poincar´ e-Bendixson Theorem, applied on
the two-dimensional invariant spaces, allow us to conclude for the existence of a heteroclinic
network Σ involving the equilibria at the vertices. See ﬁgure 1, for an image of the connections
in the network.
The network Σ is the heteroclinic network numerically observed by Sato et al. [26, section
4.3.2]. Numerical simulations in [26] reveal interesting chaotic dynamics in the neighbourhood
of the network Σ, namely the existence of chaotic switching.
As we mentioned in the proof of proposition 3.1, the dynamics of the ﬂow of system (2)
deﬁned on ∆ are conjugated to the dynamics of the ﬂow of system (3) deﬁned on D.S i n c e
the manifold D is smooth, it makes sense to use D in order to look for a suitable quotient
space in which the ﬂow is diﬀerentiable, so that we can study the local dynamics near the
heteroclinic network Σ for the ﬂow of system (3).
In order to provide an analytical proof of the complex behaviour observed in [26], we start
by noting that the network Σ corresponds to the union of the following three heteroclinic
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Figure 1: Connections in the network Σ.
cycles:
C0 :( R,P) → (S,P) → (S,R) → (P,R) → (P,S) → (R,S) → (R,P)
C1 :( R,S) → (R,R) → (P,R) → (P,P) → (S,P) → (S,S) → (R,S)
C2 :( S,R) → (R,R) → (R,P) → (P,P) → (P,S) → (S,S) → (S,R).
An equivalent description, which we shall not use, may be obtained from the union of the
following two heteroclinic cycles:
C3 :( R,S) → (R,R) → (R,P) → (S,P) → (S,S) → (S,R) → (P,R) → (P,P) → (P,S) → (R,S)
C4 :( S,R) → (R,R) → (P,R) → (P,S) → (S,S) → (R,S) → (R,P) → (P,P) → (S,P) → (S,R).
The heteroclinic cycles are invariant by the action of Γ, that is, Γ(Ci)=Ci, i =0 ,1,2.
Furthermore,
Γ((R,P) → (S,P) → (S,R)) = C0
Γ((R,S) → (R,R) → (P,R)) = C1
Γ((S,R) → (R,R) → (R,P)) = C2.
3.1 Quotient heteroclinic network
The group Γ ﬁxes the Nash equilibrium (u∗,v∗)=(
√
3
3 ,
√
3
3 ,
√
3
3 ,
√
3
3 ,
√
3
3 ,
√
3
3 )i nD and acts
freely on D −{ (u∗,v∗)}. Thus, the orbit space D/Γ is a stratiﬁed manifold with the two
regular strata (D −{ (u∗,v∗)})/Γa n d{(u∗,v∗)}. Since the ﬂow of system (3) is Γ-equivariant,
it respects the stratiﬁcation. We work then on the orbit-stratum (D −{ (u∗,v∗)})/Γa n d
consider the restriction of the ﬂow of system (3) to this manifold. By the Smooth Lifting
Theorem (theorem 0.2) in Schwarz [27], we get a smooth ﬂow in (D −{ (u∗,v∗)})/Γ. The
heteroclinic network Σ in D drops down to a heteroclinic network ΣΓ in (D −{ (u∗,v∗)})/Γ
which is the union of the following three heteroclinic cycles, as illustrated in ﬁgure 2,
C0 : ξ0 → ξ1 → ξ0
C1 : ξ1 → ξ2 → ξ1
C2 : ξ0 → ξ2 → ξ0.
In what follows, we prove switching near the quotient network ΣΓ, which is considerably
simpler than Σ. By going from the quotient to the original space, we obtain the existence of
7ξ
ξ
2
ξ 0
1
Figure 2: The heteroclinic network ΣΓ.
switching near the heteroclinic network Σ. We also show that only the cycle C0 is relatively
asymptotically stable for  x +  y < 0, as was numerically observed by Sato et al. [26].
Additionally, we show that cycles C1 and C2 are also relatively asymptotically stable for
parameter values satisfying  x +  y > 0. The region of stability is however much smaller
in this case, which explains why the stability of these cycles was not observed numerically.
Therefore the network is relatively asymptotically stable.
4 Dynamics near the quotient heteroclinic network
Consider the restriction of the system of diﬀerential equations (3) to the 4-dimensional man-
ifold (D −{ (u∗,v∗)})/Γi nR6. In the restricted ﬂow, consider the quotient heteroclinic
network ΣΓ consisting of the three (hyperbolic) saddle equilibria ξk,k=0 ,1,2 and the three
heteroclinic cycles Ci, i =0 ,1,2.
Each saddle has 2-dimensional stable and unstable manifolds. We denote by eij the
positive eigenvalues in the unstable direction, connecting equilibrium ξi to equilibrium ξj,
and by −cij the negative eigenvalues in the stable direction, connecting equilibrium ξj to
equilibrium ξi.
In the next result, we provide suﬃcient conditions for the ﬂow to be C1 linearizable around
each equilibrium ξk, k =0 ,1,2. These are conditions on  x,  y ∈ (−1,1) obtained from the
eigenvalues of the linear part of the ﬂow in table 1.
Proposition 4.1. The ﬂow is C1 linearizable around each equilibrium ξk, k =0 ,1,2 provided
all of the following inequalities hold
(i)  x  =  y;
(ii)  y  =2  x +1 ;
(iii)  y  =2  x − 1;
(iv)  x  =2  y − 1;
(v)  x  =2  y +1 .
Proof. We use the C1 extension by Ruelle [24] of Hartman’s results [14]. Ruelle’s suﬃcient
condition for C1 linearization is that
Re(λi)  =R e ( λj)+R e ( λk), when Re(λj) < 0 < Re(λk), (4)
where Re denotes the real part of a number and λi is an eigenvalue of the linear part of the
ﬂow.
At ξ0, the eigenvalues of the linear part of the ﬂow are those in the ﬁrst row of table 2.
8u1 u2 u3 u4
ξ0 e01 =1 e02 = 1+ x
2 −c01 = −1 −c02 = −
1− y
2
ξ1 e12 =
1+ y
2 e10 =1 −c12 = −1− x
2 −c10 = −1
ξ2 e20 =
1− y
2 e21 = 1− x
2 −c20 = −1+ x
2 −c21 = −
1+ y
2
Table 2: For each saddle ξk (k =0 ,1,2), the table provides the eigenvalues in the directions
of the vectors in the ﬁrst line. Note that these directions are only deﬁned locally around each
saddle in the fundamental domain D.
We have the following possibilities to verify (4)
−1 < 0 < 1: 0  = 1+ x
2 ;0  =
−1+ y
2
−1 < 0 < 1+ x
2 : −1+ x
2  =1 ; −1+ x
2  =
−1+ y
2 ⇔  x  =  y
−1+ y
2 < 0 < 1+ x
2 :  x +  y  = −2;  x +  y  =2
−1+ y
2 < 0 < 1:  x  =  y;
1+ y
2  = −1.
Given the restriction that  x,  y ∈ (−1,1), the only binding condition is  x  =  y.
At ξ1, we obtain the same restriction.
At ξ2, we obtain the remaining four restrictions.
Remark: The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for C1 linearization of Hartman’s [14]
(Theorem 12.1 applied to diﬀerential equations) show that linearization is not possible for
subsets of points on the lines described by the restrictions above. These restrictions are a
set of measure zero in parameter space, and place no serious constraint on the analysis that
follows.
From now on assume that  x and  y are such that the ﬂow is C1 linearizable. In a
neighbourhood of each equilibrium ξk (k =0 ,1,2), we choose coordinates for which the ﬂow
is linear, with the equilibrium at the origin and such that the local stable and unstable
manifolds are coordinate planes. In the system of local coordinates at each ξk, the ﬂow is
induced by a diﬀerential equation of the form below. The directions deﬁned by the ﬁrst two
coordinates are expanding and the remaining two contracting,
˙ x1 = ek,k+1x1
˙ x2 = ek,k+2x2
˙ x3 = −ck,k+1x3
˙ x4 = −ck,k+2x4 (mod 3),
where ekj and −ckj are the eigenvalues as above. The ﬂow near ξk is then given by
Ft(u1,u 2,u 3,u 4)=( u1eek,k+1t,u 2eek,k+2t,u 3e−ck,k+1t,u 4e−ck,k+2t)( m o d 3 ) , (5)
where, as stated above, we have chosen the u1 and u2 axes to correspond to the expanding
directions and the u3 and u4 axes to correspond to the contracting directions.
In table 2, we present the eigenvalues in each local coordinate system. These are obtained
from the original system of diﬀerential equations, see table 1.
94.1 Set-up for the dynamics
The dynamics both near each cycle and near the network may be described using the maps
we characterize in this section. This is done following Brannath [3].
Consider a neighbourhood of each saddle where the ﬂow can be linearized and deﬁne a
cross-section for each of the four connections in this neighbourhood. The cross-sections are
chosen to be transversal to the connection and the ﬂow. Rescaling the coordinates near each
saddle ξk (k =0 ,1,2), the cross-sections may be given by
Σ
out
k,k+1 = {(1,u 2,u 3,u 4): 0<u 2,u 3,u 4 <α k}
Σ
out
k,k+2 = {(u1,1,u 3,u 4): 0<u 1,u 3,u 4 <α k}
Σ
in
k,k+1 = {(u1,u 2,1,u 4): 0<u 1,u 2,u 4 <α k}
Σ
in
k,k+2 = {(u1,u 2,u 3,1) : 0 <u 1,u 2,u 3 <α k} (mod 3),
where 0 <α k < 1 is a positive number, small enough to guarantee transversality of the
ﬂow near each saddle. The points in Σ
out
k,j follow the connection from saddle ξk to saddle ξj.
Analogously, the points in Σ
in
k,j come from a neighbourhood of saddle ξj and are taken close
to saddle ξk. A 2-dimensional representation of these sections is given in ﬁgure 3.
ξ
k
ξk+1
ξk+1
ξk+2 ξk+2
Σ Σ
Σ Σ
in
in
out
out
k,k+1
k,k+2
k,k+1
k,k+2
Figure 3: Two-dimensional representation of the cross-sections.
We deﬁne the maps Ψi,k,j from a subset of points in Σ
in
k,i to Σ
out
k,j by the following rules,
using the linearized ﬂow:
Ψk+1,k,k+1(u1,u 2,u 4)=
 
u2u
−
ek,k+2
ek,k+1
1 ,u
ck,k+1
ek,k+1
1 ,u 4u
ck,k+2
ek,k+1
1
 
,
Ψk+2,k,k+1(u1,u 2,u 3)=
 
u2u
−
ek,k+2
ek,k+1
1 ,u 3u
ck,k+1
ek,k+1
1 ,u
ck,k+2
ek,k+1
1
 
,
Ψk+1,k,k+2(u1,u 2,u 4)=
 
u1u
−
ek,k+1
ek,k+2
2 ,u
ck,k+1
ek,k+2
2 ,u 4u
ck,k+2
ek,k+2
2
 
,
and
Ψk+2,k,k+2(u1,u 2,u 3)=
 
u1u
−
ek,k+1
ek,k+2
2 ,u 3u
ck,k+1
ek,k+2
2 ,u
ck,k+2
ek,k+2
2
 
.
From points in a cross-section Σ
out
k,i to Σ
in
i,k,w ed e ﬁ n et h em a p sΦ k,i taking points along
the connection from saddle ξk to saddle ξi in a ﬂow-box fashion as follows
Φk,k+1(u2,u 3,u 4)=
 
u2G1
k,k+1(u2,u 3,u 4),u 3G2
k,k+1(u2,u 3,u 4),u 4G3
k,k+1(u2,u 3,u 4)
 
and
Φk,k+2(u1,u 3,u 4)=
 
u1G1
k,k+2(u2,u 3,u 4),u 3G2
k,k+2(u2,u 3,u 4),u 4G3
k,k+2(u2,u 3,u 4)
 
10where G
j
k,k+i,j=1 ,2,3, i =1 ,2, are continuous functions satisfying c<G
j
k,k+i <Cfor
some constants c,C > 0.
We deﬁne the maps Ωi,k,j,l,f r o mΣ
in
k,i to Σ
in
l,j, through the neighbourhoods of saddles ξk
and ξj, as follows (see ﬁgure 4)
Ωi,k,j,l =Φ j,l ◦ Ψk,j,l ◦ Φk,j ◦ Ψi,k,j
taking points through the following sequence of cross-sections
Σ
in
k,i −→ Σ
out
k,j −→ Σ
in
j,k −→ Σ
out
j,l −→ Σ
in
l,j.
Notice that the maps Ωi,k,i,k are ﬁrst-return maps from Σ
in
k,i to itself.
ξ
k ξi
ξj
l ξ
Σ
in
k,i Σ
out
k,j Σ
in
j,k Σ
out
j,l Σ
in
l,j
Figure 4: Representation of the cross-sections in the deﬁnition of Ωi,k,j,l.
By the Implicit Function Theorem, each map Φk,k+i is a diﬀeomorphism between neigh-
bourhoods of (0,0,0). We may then approximate the maps Φ by the identity, simplifying
further calculations. From now on, we consider Ωi,k,j,l =Ψ k,j,l ◦ Ψi,k,j.
Next, we characterize the set of points that are taken from Σ
in
k,i to Σ
out
k,j for each i,j,k =
{0,1,2} and k  = i,j, that is, points for which Ψi,k,j is well-deﬁned.
So as not to make notation too cumbersome, we provide detail for Ψk+1,k,k+1,a l lo t h e r
cases being similar. Consider the unit cube containing the cross-section Σ
in
k,k+1
Q = {(u1,u 2,1,u 4): 0<u 1,u 2,u 4 < 1}≡{ (u1,u 2,u 4): 0<u 1,u 2,u 4 < 1}.
Similarly, there is a unit cube, Q  containing the cross-section Σ
out
k,k+1. Analogously to Bran-
nath [3], we may view Ψi,k,j as a map from Q to Q .D e n o t eb yCk+1,k,k+1 the set of points
in Q that are taken by Ψk+1,k,k+1 into Q . Since this assumes that there is a neighbourhood
of (0,0,1,0), containing Q, where the ﬂow is linear and transverse to Q,w h i c hm a yn o tb e
the case, the domain of deﬁnition of Ψk+1,k,k+1 is obtained by intersecting Ck+1,k,k+1 with
an open neighbourhood of the origin. We therefore focus on the study of the sets Ci,k,j
describing the domain of deﬁnition of Ψi,k,j.W eh a v e
Ψk+1,k,k+1(u1,u 2,u 4)=( u2u
−
ek,k+2
ek,k+1
1 ,u
ck,k+1
ek,k+1
1 ,u 4u
ck,k+2
ek,k+1
1 )=( ¯ u2, ¯ u3, ¯ u4),
with −
ek,k+2
ek,k+1 < 0,
ck,k+1
ek,k+1 > 0a n d
ck,k+2
ek,k+1 > 0. So, Ψk+1,k,k+1(Q) ⊂Q   if and only if u2 <
u
ek,k+2
ek,k+1
1 .W eo b t a i n
Ck+1,k,k+1 = {(u1,u 2,1,u 4) ∈Q: u2 <u
ek,k+2
ek,k+1
1 }.
Geometric representations of these points can be found in ﬁgure 5 for the two cases
ek,k+2
ek,k+1
less or greater than one. We note that the complement of Ci,k,j in Q is Ci,k,l with l  = j.
This is consistent with the fact that the dynamics are conservative in the original set-up in
Sato et al. [26].
Below, we describe the sets Ci,k,j for all maps Ψ, obtained using the eigenvalues in table
2:
Ci,0,1 = {(u1,u 2,v i) ∈Q: u2 <u
1+ x
2
1 }
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Figure 5: The left-hand side picture refers to the case
ek,k+2
ek,k+1 < 1 and the right-hand side
picture to
ek,k+2
ek,k+1 > 1. In each case, the set Ck+1,k,k+1 consists of the points in the shaded
region. The remaining points are those in Ck+1,k,k+2.
where i =1 ,2, v1 = u4, v2 = u3 and Ci,0,2 = Q\Ci,0,1;
Ci,1,0 = {(u1,u 2,v i) ∈Q: u2 >u
2
1+ y
1 }
where i =0 ,2, v0 = u3, v2 = u4 and Ci,1,2 = Q\Ci,1,0;
Ci,2,0 = {(u1,u 2,v i) ∈Q: u2 <u
1− x
1− y
1 }
where i =0 ,1, v0 = u4, v1 = u3 and Ci,2,1 = Q\Ci,2,0.
The domain of deﬁnition for the maps Ωi,k,j,l =Ψ k,j,l ◦ Ψi,k,j is obtained from the sets
above and is described by
{(u1,u 2,v) ∈ Ci,k,j :Ψ i,k,j(u1,u 2,v) ⊂ Ck,j,l},
where v = u3 or v = u4, depending on i, k and j.
4.2 Switching at the nodes
As in Aguiar et al. [1], we say there is switching at a node ξ if, for any neighbourhood of a
point in a connection leading to node ξ of a network, there exist trajectories starting in that
neighbourhood that follow along all the possible connections forward from ξ.
Theorem 4.2. There is switching at every node of the network ΣΓ.
Proof. We prove switching at a generic node ξk. Consider a connection [ξi → ξk]. Let
p =( 0 ,0,0) in Σ
in
k,i be the point corresponding to the intersection of the connection [ξi → ξk]
with Σ
in
k,i.L e tUp be a neighbourhood of p and set V = Up ∩ Σ
in
k,i. For any neighbourhood
Up the set V contains points in Ci,k,j and points in the complement of Ci,k,j in Σ
in
k,i.P o i n t s
in Ci,k,j follow the connection [ξk → ξj] and points in the complement follow the connection
[ξk → ξi]f r o mξk thus proving switching at node ξk.
4.3 Switching along the connections
We say there is switching along a connection [ξk → ξj] if, for any neighbourhood of a point in
a connection leading to node ξk, there exist trajectories starting in that neighbourhood that
follow along the connection [ξk → ξj] and then along all the possible connections forward
from ξj.
Note that switching at the nodes of the network does not guarantee switching along the
connections.
This subsection establishes switching along every connection of the quotient heteroclinic
network ΣΓ. We present a detailed proof for the case of the connection [ξ1 → ξ0]. The proof
for the remaining connections is analogous.
12We shall abuse notation, so as not to make it cumbersome, and refer to Ci,k,j when what
we mean is its intersection with the appropriate cross-section. Also, we shall use the cross-
sections Σ
out
i,j and Σ
in
i,j when we are, in fact, calculating in the corresponding cubes Q  and Q
(as in the case in the deﬁnition of Fi,k,j below).
Consider the connection [ξ1 → ξ0]. Points in Σ
in
0,1 are going to be sent to both Σ
out
0,1 and
Σ
out
0,2, as we saw in theorem 4.2. We show in theorem 4.4 that the set, C1,0,1, of points going
into Σ
out
0,1 and the set, C1,0,2, of points going into Σ
out
0,2 include points that come from both
Σ
in
1,0 and Σ
in
1,2, thus establishing switching along the connection [ξ1 → ξ0]. See ﬁgure 6.
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Figure 6: Behaviour along, before and after the connection [ξ1 → ξ0].
Deﬁne
Fi,k,j = {X ∈ Σ
out
k,j : ∃ ¯ X ∈ Σ
in
k,i : X =Ψ i,k,j( ¯ X)} =Ψ i,k,j
 
Ci,k,j
 
,
the set of points in Σ
out
k,j whose trajectory comes from Σ
in
k,i.
Switching along a connection [ξk → ξj] requires that Fi,k,j ∩Ck,j,l  = ∅ for i  = j and k  = l.
In the next proposition we provide a description of the sets Fi,k,j.
Proposition 4.3. The sets Fi,k,j for the network ΣΓ are as follows
F0,1,j = {(vj,u 3,u 4) ∈ Σ
out
1,0 : u3 <u
1− x
2
4 }
where j =0 ,2, v0 = u1, v2 = u2 and F2,1,j =Σ
out
1,j\F0,1,j;
F1,0,j = {(vj,u 3,u 4) ∈ Σ
out
0,2 : u4 <u
1− y
2
3 }
where j =1 ,2, v1 = u2, v2 = u1 and F2,0,j =Σ
out
0,j\F1,0,j;
F0,2,j = {(vj,u 3,u 4) ∈ Σ
out
2,1 : u4 <u
1+ y
1+ x
3 }
where j =0 ,1, v0 = u2, v1 = u1 and F1,2,j =Σ
out
2,j\F0,2,j.
Proof. We provide a detailed proof for F0,1,0. The other sets are obtained in an analogous
way.
By deﬁnition, F0,1,0 is the image of C0,1,0 by Ψ0,1,0. From section 4.1, we know that
C0,1,0 = {(u1,u 2,u 3) ∈Q: u2 >u
2
1+ y
1 }
13and, using table 2, we have
Ψ0,1,0(u1,u 2,u 3)=( u1u
−
e1,2
e1,0
2 ,u 3u
c1,2
e1,0
2 ,u
c1,0
e1,0
2 )=
=( u1u
−
1+ y
2
2 ,u 3u
1− x
2
2 ,u 2)=( ¯ u1, ¯ u3, ¯ u4) ∈ Σ
out
1,0.
In order to provide conditions for (¯ u1, ¯ u3, ¯ u4)t ob ei nF0,1,0, we calculate the image of the
boundary of C0,1,0 as follows
• when u2 = u
2
1+ y
1 ,w eh a v e
Ψ0,1,0(u1,u 2,u 3)=( 1 ,u 3u
1− x
2
2
1+ y
1 ,u 2)=( ¯ u1, ¯ u3, ¯ u4).
This is satisﬁed if and only if ¯ u1 =1 ,¯ u4 = u
2
1+ y
1 = u2 and ¯ u3 = u3¯ u
1− x
2
4 ,w i t h
u3 ∈ [0,1]. Hence, ¯ u3 ≤ ¯ u
1− x
2
4 .
• when u2 =1 ,w eh a v e
Ψ0,1,0(u1,u 2,u 3)=( u1,u 3,1) = (¯ u1, ¯ u3, ¯ u4),
which occurs when ¯ u4 =1 .
• when u1 =0 ,w eo b t a i n
Ψ0,1,0(u1,u 2,u 3)=( 0 ,u 3u
1− x
2
2 ,u 2)=( ¯ u1, ¯ u3, ¯ u4).
This is satisﬁed for ¯ u1 =0 ,¯ u3 = u3¯ u
1− x
2
4 ,w i t hu3 ∈ [0,1], and ¯ u4 ∈ [0,1].
Therefore, F0,1,0 = {(u1,u 3,u 4) ∈ Σ
out
1,0 : u3 <u
1− x
2
4 }.
Remark: We point out that proposition 4.3 does not require any assumption on Φk,j.
Theorem 4.4. There is switching along every connection of the network ΣΓ.
Proof. The proof consists in showing that Fi,k,j intersects Ck,j,l.
Similarly to what was done in the proof of proposition 4.3, we prove the result for F0,1,0
and the sets C1,0,1 and C1,0,2. The remaining cases are analogous.
Since Φ1,0 is the identity, we can describe F0,1,0 in Σ
in
0,1 by changing coordinates from
(u1,u 3,u 4)i nΣ
out
1,0 to (u1,u 2,u 4)i nΣ
in
0,1.W et h e nh a v e
F0,1,0 = {(u1,u 2,u 4) ∈ Σ
in
0,1 : u2 <u
1− x
2
4 }.
From section 4.1, we know that
C1,0,1 = {(u1,u 2,u 4) ∈ Σ
in
0,1 : u2 <u
1+ x
2
1 }
and
C1,0,2 = {(u1,u 2,u 4) ∈ Σ
in
0,1 : u2 >u
1+ x
2
1 }.
The intersections F0,1,0 ∩ C1,0,1 and F0,1,0 ∩ C1,0,2 and their complements are pictured in
ﬁgure 7. These are
F0,1,0 ∩ C1,0,1 = {(u1,u 2,u 4) ∈ Σ
in
0,1 : u2 < min{u
1+ x
2
1 ,u
1− x
2
4 }},
F0,1,0 ∩ C1,0,2 = {(u1,u 2,u 4) ∈ Σ
in
0,1 : u
1+ x
2
1 <u 2 <u
1− x
2
4 }.
Since, for F0,1,0∩C1,0,2 to make sense, we are implicitly assuming u
1+ x
2
1 <u
1− x
2
4 , F0,1,0∩C1,0,1
then becomes {(u1,u 2,u 4) ∈ Σ
in
0,1 : u2 <u
1+ x
2
1 }.
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Figure 7: Intersections of Fi,1,0 with C1,0,l, i =0 ,2a n dl =1 ,2, inside Σ
in
0,1.
4.4 Switching near the network
If theorem 4.4 can be iterated a ﬁnite number of times then it induces ﬁnite switching near the
network ΣΓ. For that to happen, the F-sets in theorem 4.4 are not allowed to, for instance,
be contained in just one C-set after a ﬁnite number of iterates, but they have to intersect
all of them. If we can prove that the process may be continued forever then we get inﬁnite
switching.
Theorem 4.5. There is inﬁnite switching near the network ΣΓ.
Proof. The computations in the proof of theorem 4.4 show that the intersection of Fi,k,j with
Ck,j,l is the intersection of open neighbourhoods of the origin inside Σ
out
k,j   Σ
in
j,k.
In fact, the exponents
ck,k+i
ek,k+j,w i t hi,j ∈{ 1,2} in the deﬁnition (see subsection 4.1) of
the maps Ψk+i,k,k+j, k ∈{ 0,1,2}, are positive, and so the second and third coordinates of
the image tend to zero when approaching the origin. The exponents −
ek,k+2
ek,k+1 and −
ek,k+1
ek,k+2 are
negative but, taking into account the domain of deﬁnition of the maps (the sets Ci,k,j), it is
easy to verify that the ﬁrst coordinate of the image also tends to zero when approaching the
origin. This guarantees that we can iterate theorem 4.4 an inﬁnite number of times.
Moreover, the boundaries of Fi,k,j and Ck,j,l intersect transversally inside Σ
in
j,k.S i n c et h e
sets Ci,k,j are described by conditions involving only the ﬁrst two coordinates u1 and u2,w e
will analize the behaviour in these two coordinates. From now on, we will then be considering
implicitly that we are working on planes u3 = k or u4 = k,f o rc o n s t a n tk.
As we will see, the maps Ψk+i,k,k+j, k ∈{ 0,1,2} are expanding in the ﬁrst coordinate.
We show that neighbourhoods of the origin in Ci,k,j are sent to horizontal strips through
the whole of the Σ
out
k,j that accumulate on the horizontal axis. This proves that the F-sets
intersect all of the C-sets.
If we parametrize C1,0,1 by
(u1,u 2,u 4)w i t h0 ≤ u2 ≤ u
1+ x
2
1 ,
then each vertical segment u1 = u1 of length u1
1+ x
2 is transformed into the horizontal seg-
ment u2 = u1 with length 1. So, small vertical segments near the origin are streched and
15transformed into transverse segments.
Thus, the image of C1,0,1 is the whole of Σ
out
0,1.
All the segments u1 = α intersect transversally the curves in the parametrizations of the
sets C0,1,0 and C0,1,2 in Σ
in
1,0.
If we parametrize C1,0,2 by
(u1,u 2,u 4)w i t h0 ≤ u1 ≤ u
2
1+ x
2 ,
then each horizontal segment u2 = u2 of length u2
2
1+ x is transformed into the horizontal
segment u2 = u2
2
1+ x with length 1. So, small horizontal segments near the origin are stretched
and transformed into parallel segments.
Thus, the image of C1,0,2 is the whole of Σ
out
0,2.
All these segments intersect transversally the curves in the parametrizations of the sets
C0,2,0 and C0,2,1 in Σ
in
2,0.
We get analogous results for the remaining sets and maps.
Note that the switching we have just established using the Poincar´ e maps translates triv-
ially into switching in the ﬂow. Using the symmetry, we obtain switching near the heteroclinic
network Σ of the dynamics of the Rock-Scissors-Paper game (see section 5 below).
4.5 Stability of the cycles and of the network
Analysing the conditions that deﬁne the sets Ci,k,j we conclude that the region of points, in
both Σ
in
0,1 and Σ
in
0,2, whose trajectory follows the connection [ξ0 → ξ1] is signiﬁcantly bigger
than that of points whose trajectory follows the connection [ξ0 → ξ2]. Analogously, for Σ
in
1,0
and Σ
in
1,2 and the connections [ξ1 → ξ0]a n d[ ξ1 → ξ2], respectively. This suggests that,
together with the existence of inﬁnite switching, there is a preference for one particular cycle,
namely C0. This implies some stability property for the cycle C0.
We thus address the issue of stability for the cycles Ck (k =0 ,1,2) connecting equilibria
ξk and ξk+1 (mod 3) on the network. We use the notions of relative asymptotic stability and
essential asymptotic stability used by Brannath [3] and which we include here for completion.
Consider a ﬂow on a compact metric space X.
Deﬁnition 4.6 (Deﬁnition 1.1 in [3]). Given any subset N of X, a closed invariant subset
A of ¯ N ( ¯ N the closure of N) is said to be “stable, relatively to the set N”, or “stable in N”,
if for every neighbourhood U of A there is a neighbourhood V of A, such that
∀ x ∈ V ∩ N : x(t) ∈ U ∀ t ≥ 0.
Let us call A “attracting” for M ⊂ X if for every x ∈ M the ω-limit ω(x) is a subset of A.
Then A is said to be “asymptotically stable, relatively to N”, or “asymptotically stable in N”,
if it is stable in N and there is a neighbourhood V of A such that A is attracting for V ∩ N.
Deﬁnition 4.7 (Deﬁnition 1.2 in [3]). A closed subset A of X, X ∈ Rn, is “essentially
asymptotically stable” if it is asymptotically stable relative to a set N which satisﬁes
lim
ε→0
µ(Bε(A) ∩ N)
µ(Bε(A))
=1 ,
where Bε(A)={x ∈ X : dist(x,A) <ε } and µ is the Lebesgue measure.
Note that the second notion is stronger than, and therefore implies, the ﬁrst.
We have the following result on the stability of the cycles.
16Theorem 4.8. T h er e l a t i v ea s y m p t o t i cs tability of the cycles C0, C1 and C2 depends on the
sign of  x +  y as follows:
• if  x +  y < 0, then only the cycle C0 is relatively asymptotically stable.
• if  x +  y > 0, then only the cycles C1 and C2 are relatively asymptotically stable.
Proof. We prove results concerning the stability of cycle C0 in detail. The statements con-
cerning the other two cycles follow in an analogous way.
We analyze the ﬂow in a neighbourhood of the cycle C0, using the return map
Ω1,0,1,0 :Σ
in
0,1 → Σ
in
0,1
(u1,u 2,u 4)  → (u2u
−
e02e10+e12c01
e01e10
1 ,u 4u
c02e10+c01c12
e01e10
1 ,u
c01c10
e01e10
1 ).
Given the values for eij and cij i nt a b l e2 ,w eh a v e
Ω1,0,1,0(u1,u 2,u 4)=( u2u
−
2+ x+ y
2
1 ,u 4u
2− x− y
2
1 ,u 1).
This is contracting if and only if, using the Euclidean norm ||.||,
||Ω1,0,1,0(u1,u 2,u 4)|| < ||(u1,u 2,u 4)||.
The following inequalities guarantee contractiveness:

  
  
u2 <u
4+ x+ y
2
1
u4 <u 2u
−2+ x+ y
2
1
u1 <u 4
. (6)
Let A∗ be the set of points in the domain of Ω1,0,1,0 satisfying inequalities (6). The domain
of Ω1,0,1,0 is
DΩ1,0,1,0 = {(u1,u 2,u 4) ∈ Σ
in
0,1 : u2 <u
2+ x+ y
2
1 .
From the last two inequalities of (6), we have
u2 >u
4− x− y
2
1 .
The above together with the ﬁrst inequality of (6) gives
u
4− x− y
2
1 <u
4+ x+ y
2
1
which holds provided  x +  y < 0. Thus C0 is attracting, since it is a ﬁxed point for the
return map. This implies that C0 is relatively asymptotically stable with respect to N,i f
 x +  y < 0, for
N = {Ft(u1,u 2,1,u 4): ( u1,u 2,u 4) ∈ A∗; t>0},
where Ft is as in (5).
When  x +  y > 0, we look at the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of Ω1,0,1,0.T h i s
matrix is
JΩ1,0,1,0 =




u2
−2− x− y
2 u
−4− x− y
2
1 u
−2− x− y
2
1 0
u4
2− x− y
2 u
− x− y
2
1 0 u
2− x− y
2
1
10 0




The eigenvalues are such that their product is
Det = u
− x− y
1 .
Since 0 <u 1 < 1, we have u
− x− y
1 > 1w h e n x +  y > 0. Therefore, C0 is unstable thus
showing that for  x+ y > 0, at most the cycle C1 and C2 are relatively asymptotically stable.
17Concerning the cycle C1, contractiveness occurs for  x + y > 0 as can be seen by looking
at the return map
Ω2,1,2,1 :Σ
in
1,2 → Σ
in
1,2
(u1,u 2,u 4)  → (u2u
−
3− y
1+ y
1 ,u 4u
3+ x
1+ y
1 ,u 1),
and the following inequalities 
  
  
u2 <u
4
1+ y
1
u4 <u 2u
−
3+ x
1+ y
1
u1 <u 4
.
The set N for which C1 is relatively asymptotically stable is deﬁned in an analogous way to
that of the cycle C0.
When  x +  y < 0, the cycle C1 is not relatively asymptotically stable since, for the
Jacobian matrix of Ω2,1,2,1, we have that the determinant is
Det = u
 x+ y
1+ y
1 .
This is greater than one when  x +  y < 0.
As for the stability of the cycle C2,w eu s et h er e t u r nm a p
Ω0,2,0,2 :Σ
in
2,0 → Σ
in
2,0
(u1,u 2,u 4)  → (u2u
− 3− x
1− y
1 ,u 4u
3+ y
1− y
1 ,u 1),
and the inequalities 
  
  
u2 <u
4− x− y
1− y
1
u4 <u 2u
−
3+ y
1− y
1
u1 <u 4
to show that C2 is relatively asymptotically stable with respect to a set N deﬁned as analo-
gously when  x +  y > 0.
If  x +  y < 0, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are such that the determinant
satisﬁes
Det = u
 x+ y
1− y
1 .
This is greater than one when  x +  y < 0, ﬁnishing the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 4.9. None of the cycles Ci, i =0 ,1,2, is essentially asymptotically stable.
Proof. That C0 is not stable when  x +  y > 0a n dt h a tC1 and C2 are not stable when
 x +  y < 0 follows from the previous proof.
Otherwise, the sets N deﬁned in the previous proof are such that, for i =0 ,1,2,
lim
ε→0
µ(N ∩ Bε(Ci))
µ(Bε(Ci))
< 1.
We note also that it is not strange that numerical simulations have spotted the preference,
reﬂected in relative asymptotic stability, for cycle C0 but not for cycles C1 or C2.I n f a c t ,
the domain of the return maps near the cycles C1 and C2 are as follows
DΩ2,1,2,1 = {(u1,u 2,u 4) ∈ Σ
in
1,2 : u2 <u
3− y
1+ y
1 }
18and
DΩ0,2,0,2 = {(u1,u 2,u 4) ∈ Σ
in
2,0 : u2 <u
3− x
1− y
1 }.
The domain DΩ1,0,1,0,w h e n x +  y < 0, has bigger volume than these two domains when
 x +  y > 0. See ﬁgure 8.
u 1
u2
u￿
4
u 1
u2
u￿
4
Figure 8: The ﬁgure on the left shows DΩ1,0,1,0 when  x +  y < 0. On the right, we have a
representation of DΩ2,1,2,1 and DΩ0,2,0,2 when  x +  y > 0.
We have the following result concerning the stability of the network.
Theorem 4.10. The network ΣΓ is relatively asymptotically stable.
Proof. The dynamics described in the previous subsections show that there is a ﬂow-invariant
neighbourhood of the network. The stability results obtained in this subsection guarantee
that, depending on the sign of  x+ y, there is a subset N of the ﬂow-invariant neighbourhood
satisfying the conditions of deﬁnition 4.6, but not of deﬁnition 4.7, such that trajectories,
starting in N, are attracted to at least one of the cycles of the network.
5 Dynamics near the heteroclinic network in the RSP game
In this section, we show how the switching near the quocient heteroclinic network ΣΓ can be
lifted to the original network Σ of the RSP game. We use lemma 12 in Aguiar et al. [1]. We
restate here, in the context of the present problem, both lemma 12 and its hypothesis for
completion.
Assume that
♠ The ﬁnite group Γ acts orthogonally on a manifold M, with a subgroup G acting freely
on M.
f is a Γ-equivariant vector ﬁeld on M with a Γ-invariant network of equilibria Σ.
For any two nodes n1, n2 in Σ there is at most one trajectory connecting n1 to n2 in Σ.
The only element of G that ﬁxes a node in Σ is the identity.
In the game of RSP, G and Γ are the same. The manifold M is D−{(u∗,v∗)}. The vector
ﬁeld f is given by equations (3).
Lemma 5.1. [Lemma 12 in [1]] Let f be a vector ﬁeld on M with a network of equilibria Σ
satisfying ♠ and let ΣΓ =Σ /Γ be the quotient network on M/Γ for the quotient vector ﬁeld.
Then any two paths on Σ that coincide in one node and that drop down to the same path on
ΣΓ are the same.
As an immediate consequence of lemma 5.1, we obtain switching along the connections.
Furthermore, we have
Theorem 5.2. There is inﬁnite switching near the network Σ.
19Proof. The lifted images of the sets Ci,k,j and those of the maps Ψk+i,k,k+j satisfy the prop-
erties in the proof of proposition 4.5. Thus, there is switching near the original network since
Σ is the group orbit of ΣΓ.
The existence of inﬁnite switching guarantees that all possible sequences of play are
realized by some trajectory. We then have, depending on initial conditions, trajectories that
follow very simple paths near the network and trajectories following random-like sequences.
Thus, depending on the initial choice of action, we will observe from very simple to extremely
complex sequences of play. In particular, similar initial actions may lead to very distinct
sequences of play.
The stability results obtained in subsection 4.5 are preserved under the symmetry. There-
fore, the stability results extend trivially to the cycles in the original network Σ, through the
group orbit of the cycles in the quotient network. These results support the observation made
by Sato et al. [26] concerning the fact that for  x +  y < 0 agents seem to play according to
the connections describing cycle C0. Recall that the cycle C0 connects equilibria for which
agent Y wins over agent X, to equilibria where the reverse happens. Thus for  x +  y < 0,
that is, when at least one agent is more penalized than the other is rewarded for a tie, ties
are avoided. When  x +  y > 0 ties are more rewarded for at least one agent than penalized
for the other. In this case, the relative asymptotic stability of cycles C1 and C2 shows that
agents play for ties.
6 Concluding remarks
We describe asymptotic behaviour in a simple two-person learning game, where there is no
convergence to the Nash equilibrium. We show that the asymptotic behaviour is determined
by the existence of a heteroclinic network for the dynamics and chaotic switching near this
network.
The presence of switching means that every path on the network is followed by a trajectory
for the dynamics of play. The paths may be as simple as cycles (closed loops of strategies) or
chaotic-like (following a random sequence of strategies), thus showing that in a game as simple
as the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, players’ strategies induce a variety of actions, ranging from
almost deterministic to chaotic-like actions. Even though all sequences of actions are possible,
they are not equally likely. Depending on initial conditions and the reward or penalty for
ties, there is a preference for a particular sequence involving actions leading to, or avoiding,
ties.
We make strong use of symmetry to obtain our results. Our techniques may be applied
to any game with similar characteristics.
The generalization to more than two players is out of the scope of this paper and will
appear elsewhere. The case of two players and more than three actions seems to be harder
to tackle and to require a diﬀerent mathematical approach.
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#￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿￿! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿($ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿# ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
’￿ ￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿￿)￿
￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿($ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ $ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
- ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! . . ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿- ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! . " ￿
￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ / ￿0 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿$ " ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿
! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! . 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿+￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿- ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! . 3 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿($ ￿ ￿#/ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿+￿" ￿￿￿￿% ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿- ￿" " ￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿- ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! . 7￿
#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿
￿￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿$ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! . ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿. " ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ 0 ￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿3 ￿￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ 4 ￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! . ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ / ￿0 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿! ￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! . ! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ / ￿0 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿! ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! . )￿
￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ : $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿! ￿ 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿9 ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
9 ￿￿(￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! . ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! " . ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% % ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
" ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! " " ￿
#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿(/ ￿￿￿:￿￿& ￿￿￿￿;￿! ￿9 ￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿; )￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿￿ 6 ￿￿ , ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 6 ￿
%= ￿> ￿ = %= ￿￿￿￿ 9 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿￿￿ $ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! " 2 ￿
8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ / ￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿" ￿￿￿(￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! " 3 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#/ ￿￿ / ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(/ ￿￿ / ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿9 ￿￿￿" ￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿) ￿" ￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿ ￿4 ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! " 7￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿($ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿#   ￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! " ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ " ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! " ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿($ ￿ ￿#￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿<= ￿￿(￿￿" ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
- ￿￿<$ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿+￿" ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿- ￿" " ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! " ! ￿
%￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿￿ / ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ $ A ￿ ￿#/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿> ￿! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! " )￿
￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ : $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿+￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿! ￿ 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿9 ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿" ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! " ￿￿
- ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿4 $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C￿ ￿ ￿ D￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿! 2 . ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#/ ￿￿ / ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿4 ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 2 " ￿
￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿(￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 2 2 ￿
E ￿ F ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿& ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿￿" ￿  ￿! ￿# ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 2 3 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿($ ￿ ￿#￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿) ￿" ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿8 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿9 ￿￿(￿￿ ￿￿￿#￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 2 7￿
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ / ￿0 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿5 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ > ￿￿￿#￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 2 ￿￿
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#/ ￿%￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%/ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ G ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿/ H / ￿H ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
+￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 2 ￿￿
￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿4 $ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿- ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C￿ ￿ ￿ D￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿- ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 2 ! ￿
($ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ % % ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿ <" ￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ <￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 2 )￿
￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ / ￿0 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 2 ￿￿
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿:￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿? ￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿(￿@ ￿￿& ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿A B C A ￿￿￿￿A B C D ￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 3 . ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿I ￿ ￿ ￿ J ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿9 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 3 " ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿+￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿#￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 3 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿= ￿) ￿￿￿￿E ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿   ￿ $ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 3 3 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ <￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿! ￿￿￿
￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿(￿￿" ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿%￿   ￿ $ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 3 7￿
K ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿:￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿& ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿% ￿￿￿￿> ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿- ￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿%￿   ￿ $ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 3 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#/ ￿￿ / ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ J ￿%￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ G ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
% ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿4 ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 3 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿
+￿￿& ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ F ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 3 ! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ 0 ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿
￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 3 )￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿%￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’! ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿" ￿￿G ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿
# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ 0 ￿￿" ￿￿+￿￿￿ ￿" ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ 0 ￿￿￿￿+H ￿￿" ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿/ 0 ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 3 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿4 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿! ￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿! 7. ￿
($ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ , ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ : $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿> ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿2 ￿
￿￿￿! 7" ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿($ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ , ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ : $ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿2 ￿
￿￿￿! 72 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ < ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿ / ￿0 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’! ￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿F ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿2 ￿
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